This paper characterizes preference relations % not necessarily complete and transitive over Anscombe-Aumann acts f from a state space S to a convex set of consequences X. The main feature of this model are an a¢ ne utility function u on consequences, an ambiguity index on the set of priors over the state space, and a variational Bewley representation asserting that for all acts f and g f % g , Z u(f )dp + (p) Z u(g)dp; for all p:
Intuitively, the ambiguity index captures the degree of plausibility of each probabilistic scenario. Although the decision maker requires unanimity among all priors in order to consider an act better than the other, depending on the degree of plausibility she is willing to accept some loss in expected utility when comparing two acts according to that prior. The Bewley's Knightian uncertainty model is the special case of our model where is f0; 1g-valued in which every plausible probabilistic scenario p is accorded the same degree of con…dence. In general, our model allow more permissive representations than Bewley's model, e.g., preferences with ambiguity index given by the relative entropic index. Finally, we obtain an interesting relationship between variational Bewley preferences and variational preferences based on the interplay of a pair of preferences satisfying two natural conditions, which can be viewed as a novel foundation for variational preferences. JEL Classi…cation: D81.
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Introduction
In the 80s two seminal alternative approaches appeared as foundations for the distinction proposed by Frank Knight (1921) between risk and uncertainty. Bearing in mind that risk is characterized by randomness with well de…ned probabilities and uncertainty might capture randomness with vague probabilities, both Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) and Bewley (2002) proposed a set of axioms for preference relations on uncertainty acts endogenously getting a set of probabilities compatible with the decision maker's beliefs, which leads to the multiple priors models.
On the other hand, famous axiomatizations of subjective expected utility theory (SEU), as proposed by Savage (1954) and Anscombe and Aumann (1963) , had suggested that the Knight´s distinction between risk and uncertainty is irrelevant because any uncertainty can be modeled through probabilities. In fact, subjective expected utility decision makers aim at maximizing their expected utility with respect to some subjective probability.
The …rst generation of multiple priors models were inspired by some descriptive, as well normative, criticism to SEU model 1 . The most well known objection to the theory of subjective probability was formulated by Ellsberg (1961) , which formed the basis for the notion of ambiguous beliefs, which matters for choices. In all theoretical developments, di¤erent axioms becomes necessary weakening of the standard SEU approach depending on what kind of consequence of ambiguous beliefs is considered. For instance, there are situations where no probability can rationalizes some decision maker's choices as well there are situations where the lack of some well de…ned ranking between acts is observed.
As regards the axiomatic foundation, maxmin expected utility model (MEU) of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) is based in a weaker version of independence axiom as presented in the Anscombe and Aumann's list of axiom supporting their formulation of SEU model 2 . On the other hand, for the Knightian theory proposed by Bewley (2002) its main behavioral modi…cation from the SEU model is the lack of completeness in the decision maker´s preference relation 3 . In Bewley's model a set of priors C determines a preference relation via an unanimity rule: an act f is strictly better than an act g if and only if the expected utility of f is strictly higher than the expected utility of g for every prior p in the set C. Also, Ghirardato, Maccheroni, Marinacci and Siniscalchi (GMMS, 2003) provide a derivation of Bewley´s model in the purely subjective probabil-ity framework a la Savage, but such derivation di¤ers from Bewley´s in some aspects. Most importantly, Bewley considers as primitive a strict preference relation while GMMS (2003) propose a representation using a re ‡exive relation as primitive which delivers an unanimity rule where f is at least as desirable as g if and only if the expected utility of f is at least as high as the expected utility of g for every prior p in the set C 4 . The main idea of Bewley´s model is that the presence of uncertainty might make the agent confused, which induces her to stay with her status quo. In fact, the presence of ambiguous beliefs may reduce her con…dence in her ability to compare some uncertainty alternatives, which may lead the decision maker to re ‡ect that "I can't compare such acts". Also, the inertia assumption proposed by Bewley requires unanimity among all plausible priors in order to moving away from her status quo.
However, a natural point is that decision makers might have di¤erent opinions over di¤erent reasonable models 5 , and such factor should rule out Bewley´s original unanimity principle. Indeed, Bewley's unanimity rule implicitly requires a uniform degree of importance among all models describing the likelihood of future contingencies. Intuitively, assuming a decision maker with a non uniform degree of con…dence among the set of possible priors, it seems appealing to imagine that the plausibility of a particular prior p is related to the maximal amount of acceptable loss in terms of expected utilities generated by this prior. Bewley´s model is too extreme in the sense that the set of plausible priors are given by only probabilities in the set C and every such plausible prior has an identical degree of plausibility, in which the decision maker doesn't accept any loss regardless the plausible prior is considered. We model the relative importance of each prior through an ambiguity level : ! [0; 1], where (p) (q) means that the model p is more plausible than the model q, and (p) = 1 means that the model p is discarded by the DM. The ambiguity index follows the intuition of Savage (1954) saying that "there seem to be some probability relations about which we feel relatively 'sure'as compared with others. When our opinions, as re ‡ected in real or envisaged action, are inconsistent, we sacri…ce the unsure opinions to the sure ones". The set of priors fp : (p) = 0g captures the relatively "most surety" probabilities and others less plausible probabilities are related to positive ambiguity levels revealed by which might be viewed as a basis for "sacri…cing the unsure opinions to the sure ones".
Aiming to get a model that captures the previous considerations, we characterized preference relations on the set of Anscombe and Aumann´s acts where a relative dominance rule is obtained. Our axiomatization generates a decision rule that generalizes the model proposed by Bewley (2002) via the notion of 4 Ghirardato, Maccheroni and Marrinaci (GMM, 2004) obtained the same result in the Anscombe and Aumann´s set up for general state space. See also Giroto and Holzer (2005) . 5 In the tradition dropping the classical independence axiom, some recent works capture a similar idea of di¤erent degrees of con…dence among plausible priors, e.g., Maccheroni, Marinacci and Rustichini (2006) and Chateauenuf and Faro (2009). In another framework, Nau (1992) proposed a "quasi-Bayesian" model in which beliefs are represented by lower and upper probabilities associated to con…dence weights. ambiguity index (or level): the decision maker´s subjective ambiguity index is a special mapping over the set of all probability measures with values in R + [ f+1g and the preference relation % satis…es,
u(f )dp + (p) Z u(g)dp, 8p 2 :
Here, u is the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function over the set of lotteries X. Note that if ( ) = C ( ) for some (convex and closed) set of probability measures then we obtain Bewley´s decision rule. We axiomatize preferences, called variational Bewley preferences, consistent with the decision rule above by showing how it rests on a simple set of axioms that generalizes Bewley´s model as studied by Ghirardato, Maccheroni and Marinacci (2004) , being more precise, we do not impose transitivity and we use a weaker condition than the independence axiom.
In fact, beyond a condition weaker than independence, in this paper both completeness as transitivity are not imposed for a preference relation. It is consistent with Aumann (1962) complains about the inaccurate description of actual behavior implied by completeness axiom and the normative viewpoint demanding that decision makers should make well comparison of every pair of alternatives 6 , and such considerations inspired the Bewley's model. Concerning the transitivity, recall that it is a regularity property of preferences which has the following implication: given a sequence of acts f 1 ; :::; f n such that the DM ranks f k+1 % f k for every k 2 f1; :::; ng, then the DM should compare f 1 and f n with f n % f 1 . First, we argue that the …rst requirement of a well comparison between f 1 and f n might be not natural in the normative point of view. For instance, consider the case where we have the following sequence of gambles: Suppose that there is no well speci…ed probability over the state space S = fs 1 ; :::; s 51 g and that the DM is not able to compare f 26 and f 1 . In fact, note that the "trade-o¤ between" such acts is given by f 26 f 1 = ( 25; :::; 25; 26; :::; 26), and the same considerations related to Bewley's model might explain the fact that our DM can't compare such gambles. On the other hand, for each k 2 f1; 50g, we have that each di¤erence f k+1 f k entails a small loss of one monetary unit in 50 states while causing a relatively great loss of 50 monetary units in only one state. The point here is that due to ambiguity, when comparing each pair f k+1 and f k , the DM might reveal the preference f k+1 % f k by the fact that in almost state f k+1 is close to f k but just in one state, choose f k against f k+1 might imply in a signi…cant regret as consequence of the net payo¤ f k+1 f k 7 . Indeed, this kind of example is well known from the regret literature since Bell (1982) and Loomes and Sugden (1982) 8 . The second aspect is that cycles seems natural in some circumstances of ambiguity aversion vis a vis a regret reasoning. Consider, for instance, the acts below: A horse race with a unique famous horse (#5) and others four unknown horses Each gamble pay the same amount of money in the state where the famous horse win the horse race. But, concerning the unknown ones, which we might assume the presence of ambiguity, a pessimistic regret reasoning similar to the previous example can leave to a cycle given by
In fact, this raking is consistent with a variational bewley preference represented by an utility index u (x) = x and an ambiguity index where for all probability p = ( 1 ; :::; 5 ) ;
note that (p) = 0 i¤ p = (0; 0; 0; 0; 1).
A natural interpretation for the transitive case of Bewley preferences occurs if we consider a DM taking into consideration a collection of opinions of experts or specialists. The set of multiple priors C denotes the set of di¤erent opinions revealed by the set of experts. In this model, each expert is a Bayesian agent and the DM prefer an act f to an act g i¤ all expert agree with this ranking. In our model the DM might associate a di¤erent degree of relevance for each 7 We note that this pattern of behavior is consistent with any variational Bewley preference with a utility index u (x) = x, and an ambiguity index where for all probability p = (p 1 ; :::; p 51 ) and for all k 2 f27; :::; 51g, (p) 1 51p k , ( k ) 1 for all state s k ;and ( k ) < 50. 8 It is worth to notice that regret theory is consistent with rankings in the oposite way than the way suggested by our model. 9 Loomes, Starmer and Sugden (1991) call a cycle in this direction unpredicted cycle by the usual regret theory. Predicted cycles for regret theory are cycles in the opposite direction, which could be related to the notion of majority rule. In this way, it is easy to see that Riella and Teper (2011), Theorem 2, provided an axiomatic foundation for a class of majority rule preferences consistent with predicted cycles. Note that this class of preferences cover a special case of justi…able preferences as proposed by Lehrer and Teper (2011). expert. In a sense, there is a ranking for experts captured by an ambiguity index , and the DM consider that an act f is at least as desirable as g i¤ each opinion from specialists are taking into account by saying that if an expert has an opinion p then choosing f against g it doesn't imply in an expected utility loss greater than (p).
We also obtain an interesting relationship between variational Bewley preference and variational preferences introduced by Maccheroni, Marinacci and Rustichini (MMR, 2006) . In fact, in the same way as obtained by Gilboa, Maccheroni, Marinacci and Schmeidler (GMMS, 2010) in their paper about objective and subjective rationality in multiple prior models, we show that if a variational Bewley preference % and a suitable preference relation % jointly satis…es weak consistency and default to certainty, then the preference % should be a variational preference. Weak consistence is a weaker version of consistency axiom assumed by GMMS (2010) while the later is exactly as introduced by GMMS (2010). Formally, if % is a variational Bewley preferences represented by a pair (u; ) and % is a complete, monotone and continuous preorder, then % should be a variational preference represented by (u; ) if the pair % and % jointly satis…es weak consistence and default to certainty. Note that, under weak consistency and default to certainty, variational representation of preferences can be derived without assuming the uncertainty aversion axiom of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) and without the weak certainty independence axiom of MMR (2006) 10 . The paper is organized as follows. After introducing the setup in Section 2 and the set of axioms in Section 3, we present the main representation result in Section 4. In Subsection 4.1 we derive conditions in order to obtain the countable additive case and in the Subsection 4.2 we discuss the ambiguity revealing properties, in the sense of Ghirardato, Maccheroni and Marinacci (2004) , featured by the class of preferences characterized in the main result. In Section 5, we study the interplay of preferences characterized in our main result with the class of variational preferences. In Section 6, we study some special cases, namely the incomplete preferences of Bewley (1989) as well its special case given by the SEU model of Anscombe and Aumann (1963) . Also, we derive some special class of variational Bewley preferences, e.g., the entropic Bewley preferences obtained through the relative entropic ambiguity index. Proofs and related material are collected in the Appendix.
Framework
Consider a set S of states of nature (world), endowed with an -algebra of subsets called events, and a non-empty set X of consequences. We denote by F the set of all the (simple) acts: …nite-valued functions f : S ! X which are -measurable 11 . Moreover, we denote by B 0 ( ) the set of all simple realvalued -measurable functions a : S ! R. The norm in B 0 ( ) is given by kak 1 = sup s2S ja(s)j (called sup norm) and will denote by B ( ) the supnorm closure of B 0 ( ).
Given a mapping u : X ! R, the function u(f ) : S ! R is de…ned by u(f )(s) = u(f (s)); for all s 2 S. We note that u(f ) 2 B 0 (S; ) whenever f belongs to F.
Let x belong to X, de…ne x 2 F to be the constant act such that x(s) = x for all s 2 S: Hence, we can identify X with the set F c of the constant acts in F.
Additionally, we assume that the set of consequences X is a convex subset of a vector space. For instance, this is the case if X is the set of all simple lotteries on a set of outcomes Z. In fact, it is the classic setting of Anscombe and Aumann (1963) as re-started by Fishburn (1970) .
Using the linear structure of X we can de…ne as usual for every f; g 2 F and 2 [0; 1] the act:
Also, given two acts f; g 2 F and an event E 2 we denote by f Eg the act delivering the consequences f (s) in E and g (s) in E c . We denote by := ( ) the set of all (…nitely additive) probability measures p : ! [0; 1] endowed with the natural restriction of the well known weak* topology (ba; B). We say that a mapping : ! [0; 1] is grounded if f = 0g := fp 2 : (p) = 0g 6 = ; and its e¤ective domain is de…ned by dom ( ) := f < 1g. Also, is weak lower semicontinuous if f rg is weak closed for each r 0. Moreover, we denote by the set of all countably additive probabilities in . In particular, given q 2 , we denote by (q) the set of all probabilities in that are absolutely continuous w.r.t. q, i.e., (q) = fp 2 : p qg, where p q means that 8A 2 ; if q (A) = 0 then p (A) = 0.
Functions of the form : ! [0; 1] will play a key role in the paper because it will capture the subjective degree of plausibility of our typical decision maker. We denote by N ( ) the class of these functions such that is grounded, convex and weak lower semicontinuous.
The decision maker's preferences are given by a binary relation % on F, whose the usual symmetric and asymmetric components are denoted by s and .
Axioms
Next we describe the axioms assumed for a preference relation % on the set of Anscombe and Aumann acts F, which characterizes a class of preferences that we dub variational Bewley preferences:
(Axiom 3) The restriction on lotteries %j X X is nontrivial and complete.
(Axiom 4) Archimedean Continuity. For all f; g; h 2 F the sets:
(Axiom 5) Dominance Independence: For every f; g; h 1 ; h 2 2 F, and every 2 (0; 1);
(Axiom 6) Unboundedness: There are x; y 2 X such that, for each 2 (0; 1), there exist z; b z 2 X such that
Since we are following the standard notion of weak preference, i.e., given two acts f and g the relation f % g means that "f is at least as good as g", Axiom 1 seems very natural because it says that any act is at least as good as the same. On the other hand, we relax the usual completeness and transitivity conditions about preferences over uncertainty acts. Concerning transitivity, we only impose the weaker and mild condition called "unambiguous transitivity" as de…ned in Axiom 2: it means that transitivity holds for acts f; g; h if an pair of those acts are pointwise related through a domination relation. This axiom is not new in the literature, for instance, this condition is fundamental in Nau (1992) and in Lehrer and Teper (2011) .
Axiom 3 means that preferences over consequences satis…es standard assumptions concerning the classical notion of rationality, and also there is at least one par of consequences for which the decision maker is not indi¤erent between then. Axiom 4 and Axiom 6 are technical assumptions. We also note that Axiom 2 implies the following version of monotonicity 12 : For every f; g 2 F:
Monotonicity is a state-independence condition for both weak and strict sense of preference, saying that decision makers always prefer acts delivering state-wise better payo¤s, regardless of the state where the better payo¤s occur. 8 Axiom 5 says that if a decision maker has two well de…ned preference between two pars of acts then for any two acts obtained through mixtures from the two best and worst acts of originals comparisons, respectively, then the preference between new acts obtained should respect the original ordering 13 . We note that Axiom 5 does not implies the usual Independence axiom that says:
Independence: For every f; g; h 2 F, and every 2 (0; 1) ;
On the other side, Dominance Independence axiom is stronger than the following weaker version of Independence:
W-Independence: For every f; g; h 2 F, and every 2 (0; 1) ;
It is worth noting that for variational Bewley preferences, in general, it is not true the converse of W-independence. On the other hand, variational Bewley preferences satis…es the following stronger version of Archimedean Continuity:
S-Continuity: For all e; f; g; h 2 F, the set
An interesting fact is that a re ‡exive and transitive preference relation that satis…es W-independence and S-continuity should satis…es Independence 14 . As consequence, if we add transitivity to the set of our axioms then we obtain that our preference should satis…es Independence. Also, as it is easy to see, under Dominance Independence, Independence implies Transitivity.
The Main Representation and Properties
We now derive our general representation that relies on Axioms A1-A6.
Theorem 1 Let % be a preference relation on the set of Anscombe-Aumann acts F. Then the following conditions are equivalent:
(1) % satis…es assumptions A.1-A.6. (2) There exists an a¢ ne utility index u : X ! R, with u (X) = R, and a function : ! [0; 1] that belongs to N ( ) such that, for all f and g in F,
u(f )dp + (p) Z u(g)dp; 8p 2 .
Moreover, u in (2) is unique up to positive linear transformation and for each u there is a (unique) minimal : ! [0; 1] consistent with the decision rule above and it is given by
(u(g) u(f )) dp ; 8p 2 . 
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The representation above involves a mapping de…ned on B ( ) which is a grounded, convex and weak lower semicontinuous function, hence it can be viewed as a Fenchel conjugate of some functional on B ( ), which is one of the most classic tool in variational analysis 15 . This motivates the following de…nition:
De…nition 2 A preference % on F is called variational Bewley preference if it satis…es Axioms A.1-A.6.
One interesting aspect of our main result is the fact that the function has the same properties as the cost function c in MMR's variational preferences. Unlike variational preferences, our model allows examples of incomplete and intransitive preference, satisfy a version of the independence axiom, and are not required to be uncertainty averse. Another important aspect is that is constructed directly as a supremum of expected-utility di¤erences of pair of comparable acts 16 , and the proof in the Appendix shows directly (invoking a minimax theorem and Ky Fan's theorem on linear inequalities) that the proposed representation obtains. On the other hand, MMR's representation essentially rely on the Fenchel-Moreau theorem to deliver the variational representation of preferences.
Following the Bewley inertia idea, an possible interpretation for claims that (p) measure the maximal expected loss accepted by the DM when p is the model considered for comparing acts. Note that (p) < (q) says that p is subjectively more plausible than q. So, the dominance re ‡ects such di¤erence on the decision maker´s con…dence among priors:
(u(f ) u (g))dp (p) ; 8p 2 ;
i.e., for priors the most plausible priors (i.e., for priors p 2 f = 0g) we have the dominance a la Bewley Z u(f )dp Z u(g)dp; 8p 2 f = 0g ; otherwise, the decision maker is willing to accept at most a loss (in terms of expected utility) equal to (p) for abandon the status quo. An interesting aspect of our representation rule is concerns about the indifference relation , in fact, since f g i¤ f % g and g % f , the main theorem entails that
Hence, indi¤erence is equivalent to the fact that, for any prior p, the absolute value of the gap between expected utilities is bounded by (p). So, for priors with full plausibility the di¤erence should be null; on the other hand, for priors with small plausibility, an indi¤erence f g is consistent with the possibility of a high gap between the expected values associated to f and g. Following our Theorem 1, variational Bewley preferences can be represented by a pair (u; ). Hence, we will write u and to denote our class of preferences. From now on, when we consider a variational Bewley preference, we will write u and to denote the elements of such a pair. Next we give the uniqueness properties of this representation. An interesting consequence of this uniqueness result together with the Bewley´s unanimity rule, as characterized by Ghirardato Maccheroni and Marinacci (2004) , is that our preference relation, in general, is not transitive. For instance, if we assume an "ambiguity index"
given by the well known relative entropic index 17 then the induced preference is not transitive because for any ambiguity index ; with > 0, will be given by an indicator function, which is a necessary condition for the induced preference to be transitive.
Countable Additive Priors
In our previous analysis we considered the set of all …nitely additive probabilities. By its very convenient analytical properties in applications it is very useful to consider the case of countably additive probabilities. As we will see momentarily that this is the case for the construction of some interesting examples.
If we add the transitivity condition in order to recover the Bewley model as in Ghirardato, Maccheroni and Marinacci (2004), we have that the well know Monotone Continuity axiom due to Arrow (1970) is equivalent to the conditions saying that probabilities in the set of multiple priors C are all countably additive, provided is a -algebra 18 . Fortunately, the monotone continuity axiom also ensure in our main result that only countably additive probabilities matter. Formally, the monotone continuity axiom follows as: (Axiom 7) Monotone Continuity: We say that a preference relation % on F is monotone continuous if for all consequences x; y; z 2 X such that y z, and for all sequences of events fA n g n 1 with A n # ;, there exists k 1 such that y % xA k z.
Proposition 4 Let % be a preference relation as in Theorem 1. The following statements are equivalents:
(i) The preference relation also satis…es the monotone continuity axiom, (ii) The set dom ( ) consists only of countably additive probabilities.
A Characterization of Ambiguity Levels
For the precise result concerning the characterization of on the main result as a ambiguity level we need the following de…nition:
De…nition 5 (Ghirardato, Maccheroni and Marinacci, 2004) We say that the preference relation % 1 reveals more ambiguity than % 2 if for any acts f and g
The decision maker 2 (with utility index u 2 and ambiguity index 2 ) has a richer unambiguous preference than the decision maker 1 (with utility index u 1 and ambiguity index 1 ) because the decision maker 2 behaves as if he is better informed about the decision problem.
Proposition 6
The following statements are equivalents:
a) The preference relation % 1 reveals more ambiguity than % 2 b) Both decision makers has the same attitudes towards risk (w.l.g, u 1 = u 2 ) and 1 2 .
Now, consider that the subjective expected utility is the benchmark for absence of ambiguity. We say that preference relation % reveals ambiguity when such preference reveals more ambiguity than some subjective expected utility preference % SEU . As consequence of the Proposition 6 and by f = 0g 6 = ;, the class of preferences characterized in Theorem 1 reveals ambiguity.
Connection with Variational Preferences
Gilboa, Maccheroni, Marinacci and Schmeidler (2010) (GMMS, 2010) proposed a model where a decision maker is characterized by two preference relations capturing decisions that can be labeled in terms of rationality as objective or subjective, where the …rst is modeled through the Bewley's unanimity rule and the second via the Gilboa and Schmeidler's maxmin rule, both with respect to the same set of multiple priors C.
The key axioms are consistency and caution or, using a stronger condition, default to certainty 19 . Given two preference relations % and % , for any f; g 2 F and x 2 X : Consistency: f % g implies f % g:
In this paper we use a weak version of consistency 20 , given by
The next result obtains the variational preferences of MMR (2006) by imposing conditions on the interplay of the two preferences % and % . Under weak consistency and default to certainty, variational representation of preferences can be derived without assuming the uncertainty aversion axiom 21 of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) and without the weak certainty independence 22 
axiom of MMR (2006).
Theorem 7 Let % be a variational Bewley preference represented by a pair (u; ) and % be a complete, monotone and continuous preorder. If % and % jointly satisfy weak consistency and default to certainty then
It is worth to notice that in GMMS (2010), their multiple priors version of this result obtaining a pair of Bewley-Gilboa and Schmeidler representation assume consistency. Indeed, it is easy to see that for a pair of preferences satisfying our Theorem 7, if the ambiguity index is related to a multiple prior representation then consistency holds. In another way, the same proof of GMMS's result can be done assuming only weak consistency.
Special Cases
In this section we study in some more detail special classes of variational Bewley preferences: the Knightian uncertainty model of Bewley (2002) and some preferences we just introduced, e.g., the incomplete and intransitive entropic preferences.
Bewley Incomplete Preferences
Begin with the Knightian uncertainty model axiomatized by Bewley (2002) . As we mentioned in Introduction, the Bewley model is characterized by transitivity, an axiom that we dropped in our main result. Next we show in detail the consider a pair % and % of preferences induced by as in our horse race example in the Introduction where, for all prior p = ( 1 ; :::; 4 ) (p) = 10
i . De…ne acts f and g by f := (45; 100; 100; 100; 100) and g := (50; 100; 100; 100; 100). It is easy to see that f g but g f . 2 1 Uncertainty Aversion: For every f; g 2 F , if f g then (1=2) f + (1=2) g % g. 2 2 Weak Certainty Independence: If f; g 2 F , x; y 2 X, and 2 (0; 1) ; if
relationship between transitivity and our main decision rule obtained in Theorem 1. In particular, when we add transitivity, the only probabilities in that matter are those to which the decision maker attributes maximum plausibility that is, those in f = 0g , otherwise probabilities presents null plausibility, i.e., = f = 0g [ f = 1g. Also, note that transitivity implies that every probability that matter has the same degree of plausibility.
Proposition 8 Let % be a variational Bewley preference. The following conditions are equivalent:
(i) The preference % satis…es transitivity or, equivalently, independence;
(ii) For all f; g 2 F f % g i¤ Z u(f )dp Z u(g)dp, for any p 2 f = 0g ;
(iii) The function takes only values 0 and 1.
Complete Variational Bewley Preferences
The previous Subsection showed that variational Bewley preferences satisfying the classical independence or transitivity is exactly given by the well known class of preferences proposed by Bewley (2002) . On the other hand, a natural question arises if we ask what happens if we suppose that a variational Bewley preference % satis…es completeness. This Subsection aims to study this problem. The …rst observation is that by only imposing completeness for a variational Bewley preference we don't obtain the SEU model. In fact, this is suggested by the axiomatic foundation of SEU model. Our …rst result about complete variational Bewley preferences …nd that the related decision maker behaves as if having only one full plausible prior: Proposition 9 If a variational Bewley preference % represented by a pair (u; ) is complete then there is only one prior q 2 such that (q) = 1.
We note that the converse of Proposition 9 is false as show the next example:
Example 10 Assume a state space S = fs 1 ; s 2 g and consider a variational bewley preference generate by the ambiguity index (p) = (p (s 1 ) 1=2) 2 and an utility index where u (10:000) = 1000 > u (1) = 1 > u (0) = 0. Let g = (1; 0) and f = (0; 10:000). In this case f % g does not hold because
Clearly, we have also that g % f does not hold. That is, % is not complete and (p) = 0 if, and only if, p = (1=2; 1=2).
Now we introduce a strengthening of the Axiom 6 (dominance independence):
(Axiom 7) Strong Dominance Independence: For every f; g; h 1 ; h 2 
In a sense, this pattern of behavior is contrary to the notion of strictly preference for diversi…cation: even f % g and h 1 h 2 there are portfolios using the same proportion of h 1 and h 2 such that the portfolios generated by the pair (f; h 1 ) and by the pair (g; h 2 ) are indi¤erent.
Assuming strong dominance independence as a normative requirement in accordance with the strictly preference for diversi…cation, completeness given us a really strong consequence as established in the next result.
Theorem 11
If a variational Bewley preference % is complete and satis…es the strong dominance independence then % is transitive, that is, % is a SEU preference.
Divergence Bewley preferences
We now introduce a class of variational Bewley preferences that play an important role in the rest of this section. Assume there is an underlying probability measure q 2
. Given a convex continuous function : R + ! R + such that (1) = 0 and lim t!1 (t)=t = 1, the -divergence of p 2 with respect to q is given by
The mappings D ( k ) are well known as standard divergences, which are a widely used notion of distance between distributions in statistics and information theory 23 . The two most important divergences are the relative entropy given by (t) = t ln t t + 1, and the relative Gini concentration index given by (t) = (t 1) 2 =2. The next lemma due to Maccheroni et. al. (2006) presents some important properties of divergences.
is a grounded, convex, and lower semicontinuous function, and the sets fp 2 : D (p k q) tg are weakly compact subsets of (q) for all t 2 R.
Thanks to the above properties, preferences % on F that satis…es the following rule
where > 0 and u : X ! R is an a¢ ne function, belong to the class of variational Bewley preferences. In view of their interesting properties, we call them divergence Bewley preferences. The next theorem follows from Proposition 4.
Theorem 13 Divergence Bewley preferences are monotone continuous variational Bewley preferences with index of ambiguity level given by
Concerning the analysis of comparative attitudes, the next simple consequence of Proposition 6 shows that they depend only on the parameter , which can therefore be interpreted as a coe¢ cient of ambiguity level. In order to be more speci…c about , we speak of -divergence Bewley preferences.
Corollary 14
Given two -divergence Bewley preferences % 1 and %, the following statements are equivalents:
This result says that divergence Bewley preferences become revealing more and more (less and less, resp.) ambiguity as the parameter becomes closer and closer to 0 (closer and closer to 1, resp.). In fact, since for any p 2 (q)
we obtain that divergence Bewley preferences tend, more and more, as ! 1, to rank acts according to the SEU criterion with subjective probability q. On the other hand, since for any p 2 (q)
we obtain that divergence Bewley preferences tend more and more, ! 0, to rank acts according to the very cautious criteria. For example, when q has a …nite support supp(q) such cautious criteria says that
We commented that the two most important divergences are the relative entropy and the relative Gini concentration index given, which motivates the following examples: 2 4 For the general case we need to assume some topological struture on the state spade because supp (q) := \ fE S : E is closed and q (E c ) = 0g
Example 15 If = R ( k q) :
, where q 2 ( -additive probability) and R (p k q) = R log dp dq dp if p q 1; otherwise is the relative entropy index (w.r.t q), we obtain a preference relation in a similar spirit of Hansen and Sargent (2001) ´s robustness model, but with a decision rule a la Bewley, which we dub as relative entropic Bewley preferences. In fact, by considering a pair % ; %^ of preferences as in our Theorem 9, if % is a entropic Bewley preference then %^is a multiplier preference of Hansen and Sargent (see also Strzalecki (2011) ).
is the classic concentration Gine index, which is related to the well known model proposed by Tobin (1958) and Markowitz (1952) . In fact, MMR (2006) showed that such ambiguity index for variational preferences entails the Tobin and Markowitz preference. We say that % is a Gine Bewley preference if % is a divergence Bewley preference for which G ( k q) is the ambiguity index.
Additional Examples
Completing the list of examples we proposed two cases not considered before:
, where q 2 and
is the relative entropy index w.r.t. C 25 , we obtain an interesting generalization of entropic Bewley preferences. In fact, note that if C is not a singleton it means that the decision maker has a multiple set of full plausible priors and such decision maker reveals more ambiguity that any decision maker a la entropic Bewley preferences with same parameter and reference prior q belonging to C. is the plausibility index w.r.t. the capacity v. In this case, the set of full plausible priors is the core of the capacity v, in fact
Appendix
We recall that B 0 ( ) is the vector space generated by the indicator functions of the elements of , endowed with the supnorm. We denote by ba ( ) the Banach space of all …nitely additive set functions on endowed with the total variation norm, which is isometrically isomorphic to the norm dual of B 0 ( ), so, in this case the weak* topology (ba:B 0 ) of ba ( ) coincides with the event-wise convergence topology. Given a binary relation D on B 0 ( ), some properties follows as: D is convex-a¢ ne if for all a; b; c 1 ; c 2 2 B 0 ( ) and 2 (0; 1) such that
D is monotonic continuous if for any r 1 ; r 2 ; t 2 R such that r 1 1 S B r 2 1 S and for all sequences of events fA n g n 1 with A n # ;, there exists n 0 1 such that r 1 1 S D xA n0 z. 
Also, the core of v is given by 
By Axiom 2, Axiom 3 and Axiom 5 the restriction of % on X X satis…es the set of the von Neumann-Morgenstern (1944)´s axioms and then there exist a non constant function u : X ! R such that x % y if and only if u(x) u(y) such that for any x; y 2 X and 2 (0; 1) ;
i.e., u is an a¢ ne function. Moreover, u is unique up to positive linear transformation 29 . Also, an important fact comes from the Axiom 6 about Unboundedness, in fact, we obtain that u (X) = R (see, for instance, MMR 2006). Now we de…ne the binary relation D over the set B 0 ( ) = fu(f ) : f 2 Fg by:
a D b , f % g, for some f; g 2 F such a = u(f ) and b = u(g).
We note that Axiom 7 insure that D is well de…ned on B 0 ( ) and a D b , f % g, for any f; g 2 F such a = u(f ) and b = u(g).
We note that D is: Re ‡exive: Given a 2 B 0 ( ) we have that a = u(f ) for some f 2 F, and since % is re ‡exive f % f which implies that a D a; Non-trivial : We know that % is non-trivial because there exists x; y 2 X such that x % y but not y % x, so by considering the constant functions a := u(x)1 S and b := u(y)1 S on B 0 ( ) we have that a D b but not b D a, i.e., a B b;
Convex-a¢ ne: Consider a; b; c 1 ; c 2 2 B 0 ( ) and 2 (0; 1) such that c 1 D c 2 . Hence there exist f; g; h 1 ; h 2 such that a = u(f ), b = u(g), c 1 = u(h 1 ), and c 2 = u(h 2 ), in particular h 1 % h 2 . Since % satis…es the dominance independence,
Archimedean continuous:
is closed in [0; 1] because the Archimedean Continuity of %, and a similar argu-
for any s 2 S and the monotonicity of % implies that f % ( ) g, hence a D (B) b.
Also, it is simple to see that D is unambiguous transitive. Now we de…ne a very important mapping : ! R [ f+1g for our representation and it is given by the following rule: for any probability p 2 ;
Since (a; a) 2D for each a 2 B 0 ( ), it is true that (p) R (a a) dp = 0, i.e., is a non-negative function. Now, we de…ne the mapping:
Clearly, for each (a; b) 2D the function (a;b) ( ) : ! R is linear and weak continuous. Also, since the supremum of continuous (lower semicontinuous function) is lower semicontinuous 30 we have that
is weak lower semicontinuous. Moreover, is convex because the supremum of linear functions is a convex function 31 . Now we intent to show that f = 0g 6 = ;. First we will show that inf p2 (p) = 0 and for this part of the proof we need the following result:
von Neumann´s minimax theorem i.e., D is a convex subset of B 0 ( ) 2 and, clearly, is a convex subset of ba ( ). Also, by the Banach-Alaoglu-Bourbaki theorem 33 , is a weak compact subset of ba ( ). By what we have observed is convex and weak lower semicontinuous. Moreover, it is easy to see that the function Now we will show that there exists some q 2 such that (q) = 0. Since (q) 0, it is enough to show that there exists q 2 such that (q) 0, i.e., it is possible to …nd q 2 such that Z (a b) dp 0 for any (a; b) 2D .
Denoting E = B 0 ( ) and E its dual, then our problem is to …nd some x 2 E such that hx ; 1 S i 1 hx ; 1 S i 1 hx ; a bi 0, for any (a; b) 2D .
The mathematical tool for this kind of problem was given by Fan (1956) , page 126: Ky Fan´s theorem: Given an arbitrary set , let the system hx ; x i i i ; i 2 ( ) of linear inequalities; where fx i g i2 be a family of elements, not all 0, in real normed linear space E; and f i g i2 be a corresponding family of real numbers. Z (a b) dp , we obtain that For the last statement in the theorem note that if f 0 % g 0 then (p) R (u(g 0 ) u(f 0 )) dp for any p 2 , hence Z u(f 0 )dp + (p) Z u(g 0 )dp for any p 2 .
Conversely, if (f 0 ; g 0 ) = 2% then (a 0 ; b 0 ) = 2D, where a 0 = u(f 0 ) and b 0 = u (g 0 ). Since D is a nonempty, convex (by dominance independence) and closed (by Lemma 19) subset of B 0 ( ) B 0 ( ). Using the separation theorem 34 there 3 4 See, for instance, the theorem I.7 at page 7 in Brézis (1984). f % g , Z u(f )dp + (p) Z u(g)dp; 8p 2 ; then (p) Z u(g)dp Z u(f )dp; 8p 2 and 8 (f; g) 2% so, for any p 2 (p) sup (f;g)2% Z u(g)dp Z u(f )dp = (p) :
Proof of Theorem 11 Proof. Let % be a complete variational Bewley preference. First, note that if f % g and
